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SOME RULES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF LINKS
1.If (1a) an informant operated a system under investigation and (1 b)
evidence indicates that the system failed during a mishap, then (2) the informant is
a material witness.
2. If (1a) a link is applicable to a instance type and (1 b) that instance type has
instance sub-types, then (2) the link is applicable to each of the instance sub-types.
3.The named members (persons) of the Investigation Board are assembled
for this mishap investigation:
4.A child of a instance that is closed is also closed.
5.A child of a Fault Tree instance whose closing is concurred in, is also
closed.
6.A child of a Fault Tree child is changed to conform to a parent instance
whose closure is proposed.
7.A top level proposed cause corresponds to a mishap root.
8.Place 10 team members a-mails into a folder for the specific time period
(e.g., day, week or month) the e-mail was received.
Fig. 6
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MULTI-USER INVESTIGATION ORGANIZER 	 ciated information products) that are relevant to the mishap
investigation. The ontology also describes important proper-
FIELD OF THE INVENTION	 ties and a range of parameter values, where relevant, of each
class and indicates potential relationships between two or
This invention relates to a multi-user information and s more such classes. Instantiations stored in the repository are
analysis system to support the investigation of classes of 	 classified and indexed according to the ontology.
occurrences, such as mishaps and accidents. 	 A user, such as an investigator of a mishap, can specify
properties of one or more stored instantiations and can asso-
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION	 ciate one or more relevant electronic files with an item, manu-
io ally and/or automatically. A user can establish a link between
Today, a wide variety of different media and different 	 two or more instantiations based on one or more relationships
instruments are used to record evidence relating to mishaps 	 set forth in the ontology, and the instantiation or related
and accidents. This evidence may be collected and stored at 	 instantiations can be viewed using the hypermedia browser,
remote locations and can include the information in handwrit- 	 using the established links to navigate through the space of
ten notes, e-mail, text documents, taped or transcribed inter-
 is interrelated items. A user can create and view a proposed or
views with witnesses, other multi-formatted data files, and 	 accepted analysis model that specifies causal vectors or
images generated by software and/or hardware. The collec-	 hypothesized mishap sequences that may have contributed to,
tion, organization and integration of such evidence are diffi- 	 or led to, a target event (e.g., a mishap) under investigation. A
cult, time consuming processes for the investigating team.	 causal model is linked to one or more repository instantiations
These processes are necessary, however, to enable the most 20 that provide evidence to support or refute the hypothesized
important investigation process understanding the rel-	 cause(s) of the target event (the mishap). The models can be
evance and relationships within the evidence and informa- 	 viewed with linear, hierarchical and network diagrams dis-
tion. When a mishap or accident (referred to collectively	 playedby the user interface. Probabilities and correlations are
herein as a "mishap") is investigated by a team that is geo- 	 assignable to and between causes and/or contributing factors,
graphically dispersed, information management and coordi- 25 and to alternative consequences of causes and/or contributing
nation problems are particularly acute. Few systems have 	 factors, of a mishap in a risk analysis.
been developed that can support these fundamental investi- 	 The system supports: simultaneous evidence gathering at
gation processes. 	 multiple, geographically distributed sites; dynamic reform-
What is needed is a system that facilitates organization, 	 ing of investigation teams and/or objectives; time-critical data
collaboration and communication between two or more sys- 30 searching, collection, testing and analysis; complex and dif-
tem users, who may be but need not be remote from each 	 fering organizational environments; different biases; use of
other, for data gathering for, and analysis of, a class of events, 	 multiple models; managing and tracking of investigation
such as mishaps. Preferably, the system should be available 	 progress and status; and heterogeneous data collection, pro-
on an intra-net or internet system and the messages should 	 cessing, cataloging, tracking and distribution.
preserve confidentiality, encourage unconstrained communi- 35	 A key objective of the invention is to enable distributed
cation between users and preserve process integrity.	 teams of users to better organize, represent and analyze data
collected, identify correlations between data items, and iden-
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION	 tify evidence and inferences drawn from such data, through
implementation of a methodology for investigating mishaps.
These needs are met by the invention, which enables key 4o Another objective is to integrate and allow visualization of
elements of successful investigation, including: (1) gathering 	 data within a context of graphically presented and analyzed
and sharing disparate types of information; (2) identifying the 	 data, intermediate results and final results.
relationships between different information items; (3) under- 	 In a typical situation, one or more analytical models are
standing the significance of such relationships; and (4) pre-	 developed by team members to describe or explain part or all
serving the chain of evidence. The invention facilitates the 45 of the mishap and to drive the investigation process. The
first of these elements through a Web-based application that	 modeling process may involve a fault tree analysis and/or a
can be accessed by one user or by a geographically dispersed 	 mishap oversight risk tree (MORT) diagram, which decom-
team of users, to classify, store, retrieve and display any type 	 pose the mishap or accident into different tiers or levels of
of digitally expressed investigation material in a secure envi- 	 detail. The team may also characterize an event as a sequence
ronment, and to catalog and track physical evidence and so of sub-events that are believed to have contributed to the
documents. The second element is facilitated by defining an 	 mishap. Alternatively, features and parameter values in simi-
ontology of different types of investigation-relevant record	 lar situations, in which the mishap did not occur, or occurred
types (referred to herein as ontology "classes") and their 	 in a different manner, may be compared with corresponding
interrelationships ("linkages"). The ontology forms the basis 	 features and parameter values in the mishap to identify
for a semantic network structure that literally allows an inves-
 ss changes in situation parameters that may have contributed to
tigator team to "connect the dots" through use of the linkages.	 the mishap. These approaches, their characteristics and avail-
The third element is facilitated through models and tests for 	 able data are integrated by the system and made available to
causality and consistency, using several methods embedded 	 all team members.
within the system, including but not limited to fault trees,
event sequences and other accident characterization models. 60	 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The evidence gathered and structured through use of the
invention can be directly and electronically archived to pre- 	 FIG.1 is a high level view of a system suitable for practic-
serve the evidence and investigative reasoning. 	 ing the invention.
The customizable or reconfigurable ontology that forms 	 FIG. 2 illustrates kinds of information that can be repre-
the basis of the semantic network structure specifies and 65 sented and linked using the invention.
permits instantiation of ontology classes (e.g., persons, loca- 	 FIG. 3 illustrates how the system supports links between
tions, events, causes, associated projects, systems and asso- 	 different types of data.
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FIG. 4 illustrates contribution of information from various
sources to a particular mishap investigation.
FIGS. 5A, 5B and 5C illustrate browser interface screens
for a particular investigation project, involving an improper
preload of bolts on a canard rotor wing attachment.
FIG. 6 illustrates some rules applicable to link establish-
ment.
FIG. 7 is a flow chart for performing a root cause analysis.
FIGS. 8, 9A, 9B and 10 illustrate a fault tree analysis, an
event sequence analysis and a multi-linear event sequence
analysis, respectively.
FIGS. 11,12 and 13 provide more detailed views of visual
presentations associated with a fault tree analysis and an
event sequence analysis.
FIG. 14 is a flow chart illustrating a parameter comparison
method for analyzing a target event.
DESCRIPTION OF BEST MODES OF THE
INVENTION
FIG. 1 illustrates a system 11 for practicing the invention.
The system 11 includes a reconfigurable ontology module 13
that includes a list of ontology classes (e.g., persons, loca-
tions, events, causes, associated projects, systems and asso-
ciated information products) relevant to the target event(s)
(e.g., a mishap). Each ontology class in the ontology module
13 has one or more definitions or properties of each ontology
class and a range of values of each ontology class, where
relevant and available.
The system 11 includes a semantic network 15 that
receives, indexes and stores, for subsequent retrieval, the
definitions, properties and/or value ranges of instances of the
ontology classes, and that provides a link or relationship
between each ontology class instance and one or more other
instances. The semantic network 15 serves as a database, as an
instantiator for characterization of the target event(s, and as a
collaborative workspace for two or more users. The system 11
includes a network browser interface 17 that provides a pro-
cedure for storing, for calling up and for presenting, in graphi-
cal, alphanumeric and/or audio format, information on the
instances stored in the semantic network 15. The system 11
also includes a rule-based inference engine 19, including a
collection of at least two rules or syllogism procedures, appli-
cable to at least two classes, which can be used to automati-
cally establish a link or relationship between two or more
instances, or to establish new instances or property values.
FIG. 2 illustrates some of the kinds of information that can
be stored, represented, displayed, indexed and selectively
linked to each other. A mishap 21 is optionally linked to one
or more of the following: an investigation board class 31, a
project class 41, a process class 51, a person class 61, a
location class 71, an event characterization class 81, a records
class 91, a documents class 101, a physical evidence class
111, a sub-system class 121 and an analysis class 131, and an
investigation results class 141.
The investigation board class 31 can be linked to material
on meetings and meeting agendas 32, receipt or generation of
requests for information 33, individual investigator informa-
tion 34, investigation procedures 35 and investigation report
(s) 36.
The project class 41 includes material on the project or
projects under which the mishap occurred, including project
controls 42, project plans 43, project procedures 44, project
reviews 45, project mission 46, mission timeline 47, mission
description 48 and mission requirements 49.
4
The process class 51 includes material on process descrip-
tion 52, process controls actually implemented 53, and stan-
dard operating procedures (SOPS) for the process 54.
The person class 61 includes material on each person 62
5 involved in, or responsible for events leading directly for the
mishap, the group or other unit 63 to which the person
belongs, the person's normal responsibilities 64, identifica-
tion of each event participant 65, identification of each inves-
tigator 66 and the task(s) for each investigator 67.
10 The location class 71 includes material on the locations)
72 at which the mishap occurred, any other locations) 73
affected by the mishap, changes recommended for any loca-
tions) 74 as a result of investigation of the mishap, location
(s) 75 of each evidence processing site, and locations) 76 of
15 each record impound site.
The event characterization class 81 includes material on
type of mishap event 82, immediate consequences 83 of the
mishap, indirect consequences 84 of the mishap, speculative
or confirmed factors 85 that contributed to the mishap, and
20 recommended changes in procedures and/or equipment 86 to
avoid or reduce the likelihood of another occurrence of the
mishap or of any related event.
The records class 91 includes location(s) 92 of each rel-
evant written or published document, locations) 93 of each
25 relevant audibly perceptible record, location(s), locations)
94 of each relevant visually perceptible record, and identifi-
cation 95 of any anomalies in the records.
The documents class 101 includes material 102 on each
relevant agreement respecting the project, analysis report
30 records 103, incident report records 104, personnel perfor-
mance records 105, training records 106, project control pro-
cedures and records 107, review documents 108 and other
documents 109.
The physical evidence class 111 includes information 112
35 on debris produced in connection with the mishap and other
physical evidence 113.
The sub-system class 121 includes material on design and
review records 122, design analysis 123, preceding mishap
records 124, riskassessments associated with relevant param-
4o eters 125, sub-systems affected by the mishap 126, test and
verification records 127, and integration records 128.
The interviews class 131 includes information 132 devel-
oped by direct query of an interviewee, information 133
developed subsequently as a result of one or more responses
45 by an interviewee, and physical evidence and related infor-
mation 134 provided by an interviewee.
The operations log class 141 includes records and quanti-
tative measurements 142 taken during one or more operations
50 at times preceding, or at the time of, the mishap.
The inspections log class 151 includes the results 152 of
visual and other inspections made at times preceding, or at the
time of, the mishap.
The site inspection class 161 includes the results 162 of one
55 or more inspections of a site of the mishap, after the mishap
has occurred.
The design records class 171 includes information 172
obtained from records of design and/or material parameters
of one or more components that may have contributed to the
60 mishap.
The analysis class 181 includes material onresults ofappli-
cation of fault tree analysis 182, results on application of
MORT analysis 183, results on application of event sequence
analysis 184, and results from differential comparison of
65 parameters associated with the mishap and corresponding
parameters in similar situations where no mishap occurred
185.
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The investigation results class 191 includes information
192 on background facts, information 193 concerning find-
ings of fact, information 194 on recommendations resulting
from the investigation, and other results 195 of the investiga-
tion.	 5
The investigation may rely upon at least seven types of
information concerning the mishap: operation logs (before,
during and/or after the event); design records of equipment
and components associated with the event; records of fabri-
cation of equipment and/or components actually involved in io
the mishap; interviews with persons who witnessed the event
or who inspected the equipment and components before and/
or after the event; inspection and maintenance logs that were
prepared before and/or after the event; physical evidence,
including but not limited to photographs and photomicro- 15
graphs and chemical analyses of the equipment and compo-
nents; and results of experiments performed on similar sys-
tems before and/or after the event
FIG. 3 illustrates a typical set of relationships among a
subset of the information classes set forth in FIG. 2 and an 20
event sequence analysis (FIGS. 9A, 9B and 10) or a fault tree
analysis (FIG. 8). In FIG. 3, interviews, operation logs, and
quantitative graphical presentations contribute to an event
sequence analysis; and operations logs, inspection logs, for-
mal records and documents, quantitative graphical presenta- 25
tions and microphotographs contribute to a fault tree analysis.
FIG. 4 illustrates an example of linkages of correlated
information, as implemented by the invention, applied to a
particular (CRW) mishap. Investigation of this mishap relies
upon, among other things, inspection of the site, inspection of 30
the components and subsystems, examination of design
records of the components and operation logs. This investi-
gation has at least one hypothesi s (improper bolt preload) that
is refuted by examination of the designrecords for the system.
FIG. 5A is an example of an investigation organizer user 35
interface screen 201, illustrating its use in an investigation of
physical evidence (debris) collected following a mishap
involving improper preloading of bolts on a canard rotor wing
blade attachment. This interface allows a user to view one
instance (Blade Attach Fitting #1) on a right portion 201-R of 40
the screen and to view established other instances or features
with established links to the viewed instance on a left portion
201-L of the screen.
A user can navigate through the information network,
using a sequence of links, view metadata associated with a 45
given instance or instances, search for specific records, and
enter new data and/or modify extant data (with suitable safe-
guards imposed), using the interface 201. In the example,
descriptor items relating directly to the item of physical evi-
dence, Blade Attach Fitting #1, such as description, identify- 50
ing number, record creation date, collected by, date of last
record update, responsible group, investigation incident, sup-
ports, are displayed on the right portion 201-R of the screen.
Note that not all of the descriptor items shown on the right
portion 201-R of the screen may have information available 55
and displayed.
In the particular example in FIG. 5A, links are provided
from the debris instantiation (part of physical evidence) to the
following other instantiations: Liam G. Man, as collector and
as custodian; five analysis report records that provide the 60
results of analysis of this physical evidence item; the sub-
system (Blade Attach Assembly #1) with which the physical
evidence item is identified; ten photos taken of the physical
evidence item; a debris map showing the location where the
physical evidence item was collected; the responsible group 65
for this investigation; an investigation in which this physical
evidence item is involved; and a hypothesis supported by the
6
physical evidence item. When a user activates a link to a
instance shown on the left portion 201 -L of the screen, such as
the debris map instance shown in FIG. 5A, the interface
displays that (linked) instance and its metadata on the right
portion 201-R of the screen and also displays links to the
displayed instance, including the link to the original instance,
Blade Attach Fitting #1
Other interface images associated with the alphanumeric
data presented in FIG. 5A include a photomicrograph of the
failure region of the fitting, and a debris map of the fitting,
shown in FIGS. 5B and 5C, respectively.
When a user clicks on and activates a instance link, the
interface displays the instance description on the right portion
and links to the chosen instance on the left portion, as in FIG.
5A. Links to each instance are explicitly stored and displayed
so that a user need not rely upon human memory to provide
such links. This avoids the difficulties present when a user is
unfamiliar with the scope of the program or its details, when
the user has not used the program recently, or when the user
has a large quantity of unrelated heterogeneous information
to maintain. Links of a given instance to other instances are
shared by all users of the interface.
Modification of information associated with a instance or
with a instance link is treated as follows. Where a new
instance is introduced, the user, or an automated system, may
add one or more links between the new instance and one or
more extant instances. Where a link that already exists is to be
deleted, deletion of the link does not delete any instance
connected by the link, although a new link may need to be
established: each instance should have a link or relationship
with at least one other instance. Information added to a
instance is parsed, optionally using the rule-based inference
engine, to determine if one or more additional links should be
added to the list of links or relationships. Information deleted
from an instance may have the opposite effect, wherein one or
more links associated with that instance is deleted.
FIG. 6 indicates some basic rules that are applied by the
rule-based inference engine 19 (FIG. 1) to determine whether
a link or relationship should be established between two
instances.
Another interface component allows users to collabora-
tively view and annotate images stored in the repository.
Another interface component allows Microsoft Office users
to save Office files directly into the repository. Another inter-
face component allows a user to establish an e-mail distribu-
tion list, where messages and attachments (each treated as a
instance) sent to recipients are integrated automatically into
the repository, with user-defined or automatically-defined
links.
The system includes a framework and graphical tools for
causal modeling, including fault tree analysis for displaying
relationships between, and a timeline of, events that may have
contributed to one or more target events.
A. D. Livingston, G. Jackson and K. Priestley, in "Root
causes analysis: Literature review," published by Health &
Safety Executive Books, Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
2001, summarize each of about 11 root cause analysis
approaches. A "root cause" is defined, for purposes of this
book as "the most basic cause the can be reasonably identified
and that management has control to fix."
For purposes of this discussion: an "event" is a real time
occurrence, describing one discrete action, such as an error
committed, a failure or a malfunction; a "condition" is an
as-found state, whether or not resulting from an identified
event, that may have health, safety, quality, security, opera-
tional or environmental implications; a "barrier" is a physical
device or administrative control that is used to eliminate, or to
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reduce to an acceptable level, the risk of an undesired out-
come; a "contributing factor" is an event or condition that
may have contributed to the outcome but whose modification
or elimination would not, by itself, have prevented the out-
come; and an "organizational factor" is any operational or
management structural entity that exerts control over the sys-
tem at at least one stage in the system's cycle, including but
not limited to the system's conception, development, design,
fabrication, test, maintenance, operation and disposal.
In mishap analysis, one usually distinguishes between a
proximate cause, an intermediate cause and a root cause. A
suitable definition of a "proximate cause" or "direct cause" is:
"the event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that
existed immediately before the undesired outcome,
directly resulted from its occurrence, and, if this event
were eliminated or modified, would have prevented the
undesirable outcome."A proximate cause may be char-
acterized as a cause that occurs immediately or directly
before the undesired outcome. Examples of undesirable
outcomes include failure, anomaly, schedule delay, bro-
ken or dysfunctional equipment, product defect, close
call and mishap.
A suitable definition for a "root cause", which is adopted
here, is:
"one or more factors (events, conditions or organizational
factors) that contributed to or created the proximate
cause and subsequent undesired outcome and, if this
factor were eliminated or modified, would have pre-
vented the undesired outcome."
An intermediate cause occurs between a root cause and a
proximate cause.
A root cause analysis (RCA) is a structured evaluation
method or protocol that identifies the root cause(s) for an
undesired outcome and actions that are adequate to prevent
recurrence of the undesired outcome. Root cause analysis
should continue until all relevant organizational factors have
been identified, or until relevant data are exhausted. Ideally,
an RCA helps a user determine what happened, how it hap-
pened, why it happened, and how it may be avoided in the
future. An objective of RCA is to identify root causes so that
these latent failures can be eliminated or modified to prevent
future occurrences of similar problems. If an RCA is not
performed, a user may only identify and remedy the proxi-
mate causes of a mishap or problem, and the underlying
cause(s) may continue to produce similar problems or mis-
haps in the same or related areas.
FIG. 7 is a flow chart of a suitable procedure for performing
a root cause analysis. In step 210, all documents, data and
physical evidence relevant to the mishap are gathered. In step
211, one ensures that all evidence (including documents, data
and physical evidence is secure and protected against com-
promise and/or theft. In step 213, witness statements relevant
to the mishap are gathered as soon as possible. In step 215, a
timeline is constructed beginning from the last event that is
part of the mishap. In step 217, the analytical tools that are
necessary or appropriate to complete the investigation are
identified. In step 219, evidence is analyzed and root causes,
proximate causes and contributing causes are determined.
Optionally, this includes generation of one or more solutions
that identify root, proximate and contributing causes. In step
221, findings, root causes, observations and recommenda-
tions are developed. In step 223, one or more corrective
actions and lessons learned are identified (optional) in
response to receipt of a task statement that explicitly requests
this. In step 225 (optional) signatures and approvals of mem-
bers, advisors and consultants forthe mishap investigation are
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obtained, and a report is assembled. In step 227 (optional), a
mishap investigation report is provided for review, comment
and approval.
With reference to step 210, the user preferably determines
5 one or more of the following facts concerning the undesirable
outcome: (1) When did the outcome occur; (2) Where did the
outcome occur; (3) What conditions were present before
occurrence of the outcome; (4) What controls or barriers
could have prevented the outcome, but did not; (5) Why did
io the controls or barriers not prevent the outcome; (6) What are
all the potential causes of the outcome; and (7) What changes
can be made in the system, equipment, protocols and/or train-
ing to prevent recurrence of the outcome?
With reference to step 219, a root cause should take
15 account of any organizational factor that exerts control over
the design, fabrication, development, maintenance, operation
and/or disposal within the system. A problem that is not at
least partly correctable by the user's organization does not
qualify as a root cause.
20 A fault tree analysis (FTA) is a graphic model that displays
and connects logical combinations of failures that can result
in an incident, such as a mishap. The combinations include
equipment failures, human errors and management system
failures. A fault tree begins with a "top event," usually a
25 specific undesired event, such as a mishap or system condi-
tion. The top event is then decomposed into contributing
events that are structured according to specified rules and
logic. After the fault tree structure is completed, different
connected events are analyzed to determine what combina-
30 tion(s) of failures are likely to have caused the top event. One
aim of the ETA is to identify a "minimal cut set," a group of
basic events that will cause the top event to occur. A first order
cut is a basic event that will, by itself, cause the top event to
occur (with probability substantially equal to 1). An Nth order
35 cut is a connected set of N events (N>2) that will cause the top
event to occur, where deletion of any one of the N events will
reduce the probability that the top event occurs to a value
substantially less than 1, including 0).
An ETA is developed graphically using: base events; unde-
40 veloped events (for which no further modeling is possible,
with the data available), intermediate events that are contrib-
uted to by occurrence of two or more other events; and Bool-
ean connectives such as the binary operators AND, OR and
NOT. FIG. 8 illustrates a structure 301 of a simple ETA in
45 which either of first and second base events, 303 and 305,
contribute to a first intermediate event 307. Occurrence of the
first intermediate event 307 or of a first undeveloped event
309 contributes to a second level occurrence. Presence of the
second level occurrence and of a third base event 311 pro-
5o duces a second intermediate event 313. Presence of (all three
of) the second intermediate event 313, of a third intermediate
event 315, and of a second undeveloped event 317 produces a
top event 319. In this illustration, the minimum cut set is third
order, requiring occurrence of the second and third interne-
55 diate events, 313 and 315, and of the second undeveloped
event 317.
An ordered sequence of target events (including, but not
limited to, a single event) may incorporate, or lead inexorably
to, a particular event, such as a mishap. Each event in the
60 ordered sequence is analyzed, although the particular event
may depend primarily on less than all of the target events. One
or more events in the ordered sequence may be decomposed
into a sub-sequence of two or more subsidiary events, in order
to more conveniently analyze the event sequence.
65 Event sequence analysis (ESA) uses an event sequence
diagram, wherein each of a sequence of contributing events is
presented on a time line graph. In one format, each event in a
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sequence is connected to at least one other event in a time line,
indicated by horizontal arrows, with primary events on one
time line and secondary or tertiary events on a parallel time
line. A condition (not qualifying as an event) is connected to
an event by a vertical arrow. Each event describes an occur-
rence or single discrete action, not a condition, and each event
is described by a noun or a verb. An occurrence must be
precisely described and is quantified, where possible. Events
range from a beginning time to an end of the mishap
sequence, and each event is derived from a preceding event.
An initial version of an event sequence may contain unre-
solved gaps in the events, and additional information may
need to be developed and included.
An event sequence analysis (ESA) constructs a diagram
with the final event, usually the conclusion of the mishap, and
works backward in time by connecting this end point to
relevant events that preceded the end point. In a first diagram,
only the most immediate contributing events may be
included, with other events being added as their relevance
becomes clearer. In an event sequence diagram: (1) each
event is enclosed in a rectangle; (2) each condition is enclosed
in an oval; (3) all conditions are connected to other conditions
and/or to events by dotted lines; (4) each event or condition
should be based upon valid evidence or indicated to be oth-
erwise by use of a dotted rectangle or dotted oval; (5) A
primary sequence of events is shown as a straight horizontal
line; (6) secondary event sequences are presented at different
levels; and (7) relative time is from left to right; (8) an event
must describe an occurrence, not a condition, and must
involve one discrete action, described by a noun or verb; (9)
an event should be quantified, where possible; (10) events
should range from a beginning time point to an end time point
of the accident sequence; and (11) each event should be
derived from one or more events that precede it in time. FIG.
9A illustrates a typical event sequence diagram 401 having a
primary event sequence with first, second, third and fourth
primary events, 403, 405, 407 and 409, first and second sec-
ondary events, 411 and 413, that together feed into the second
primary event 405, and a condition 415 that affects the second
secondary event 413. The final result is an accident or mishap
417.
FIG. 7B illustrates an event sequence diagram for a par-
ticular mishap, involving a collision of a vehicle with a tree, as
the vehicle swerves to avoid contact with a child running into
a road on which the vehicle travels.
A multi-linear events sequencing analysis (MESA), illus-
trated in FIG. 10, is an enhancement of the ESA in which
primary event sequences can appear on more than one hori-
zontal line. Relevant primary events, 451, 453, 455, 457 and
459, as supported by appropriate conditions, 461, 463, 465,
467 and 469, are joined at appropriate time points with each
other to produce an outcome 471.
A management oversight and risk tree (MORT) analysis, in
its broadest scope, includes as many as eight interconnecting
trees, through which 98 generic problems and at least 200
basic causes can be identified. MORT analysis uses symbols
and logic similar to those used in an FTA, with two differ-
ences. First, MORT begins with a fault tree that has already
been constructed; the user works through the fault tree and
discards the branches that are found to be not relevant to the
mishap. Second, MORT analyzes what happened during a
mishap and traces the causal factors back to management
systems and protocols to attempt to identify what or how a
contributing event occurred. A MORT analysis works with a
diagram or chart already constructed using another root cause
approach, such as ETA or event sequence analysis (ESA).
The system optionally provides a link between a root
cause, a proximate cause and/or a conclusion (a "position")
and each evidence item that supports this position or that
refutes this position. This allows a user to evaluate the
5 strength of such a position.
FIG. 11 illustrates a visual presentation of a fault tree
analysis intermediate result or final result according to an
embodiment of the invention. In this illustration, a rotor test
stand connection failure is being analyzed. Each relevant
io conclusion statement below this root conclusion is connected
to the root conclusion by one or more line segments that
indicate a direct (support) relationship of the conclusions that
appear at each end of the line segment. Each of a group of
seven possible conclusions, indicated as Cl on the left (e.g.,
15 "connection design flaw," "connection fabrication flaw," etc),
has been determined to be not credible. Associated with each
of these conclusions is a support symbol a/b, where each of a
and b is a non-negative integer. The integers "a" and "b"
represent the number of evidence items assembled thus far
20 that support the conclusion and the number of evidence items
that refute (or are inconsistent with) this conclusion, respec-
tively. Thus, for example, the symbol 1/0 associated with the
conclusion "bearing defective" indicates that one evidence
item supports this conclusion and no evidence item refutes
25 this conclusion. On the right side of FIG. 10, each of the
conclusions "nominal loads" and "resonance present" (also
indicated as Cl, with support symbols 0/0) has also been
determined to be non-credible. More generally, the system
optionally provides a link between a root cause, a proximate
30 cause and/or a conclusion and each evidence item that sup-
ports this position or refutes this position.
The handle marked "MV" allows drag-and-drop move-
ment of the attached conclusion box to another location
within the illustration. When the user clicks on the handle
35 marked "IO," more detail is provided on the associated con-
clusion.
On the right side of FIG. 11, each of the conclusions indi-
cated as C2, namely "connection overloaded," "off-nominal
loads encountered," "imbalance," "blade retention failure,"
4o and "bolts," has corresponding support symbol of 0/0, and
these conclusions were not yet reviewed at the time the (inter-
mediate) result presentation shown in FIG. 11 was prepared.
Each of the conclusions indicated as C3, namely "(rotor) not
properly balanced," "control failure" and "pitch link failure,"
45 requires additional data before analysis can proceed. Each of
the conclusions indicated as C4, namely "thrust bearing,"
"flange" and "(bolt) fatigue," are proposed conclusions and
the conclusion "(bolt) defective" needs further analysis. The
illustration shown in FIG. 11 provides a snapshot of the status
50 of possible conclusions that can be drawn at an intermediate
point in the fault tree analysis, beginning with the root con-
clusion "rotor test stand connection failure."
Each conclusion statement in FIG. 11 is assigned to one
(and only one) of the following conclusion categories: con-
55 clusion is not credible; conclusion is unlikely; conclusion is
credible; conclusion needs analysis; conclusion needs data
(for support); conclusion is proposed to be closed; and un-
reviewed conclusion. These conclusion categories may be
supplemented by other categories, and the statement of each
60 category (e.g., conclusion is not credible) can be replaced by
words having a similar interpretation.
FIG. 12 illustrates a chronological arrangement of condi-
tion statements (boxes in an oval format) and event statements
(boxes in a rectangular format) in an event sequence analysis.
65 Optionally, each event statement has a date associated there-
with. The first and second relevant conditions, Conl and
Con2, shown on the left, are "bolts weakened by tightening"
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and "strong shear winds (present)." The effects of these two
condition statements combine to produce an event statement
"bolts fractured," which is followed chronologically by the
event statements "engine fell off," "debris shreds control sur-
faces (of aircraft)" and "plane strikes building." A condition
statement and/or an event statement can be added to, or
deleted from, the sequence at any point in the development,
using the MV handles to move a condition statement and/or
an event statement or to introduce or delete such a statement.
This allows inclusion of new or modified information as new
information is developed.
When the user clicks on the handle marked "IO", the screen
returns to the standard browser interface where more detail is
provided on the associated condition or event. In FIG. 13, the
user has clicked on the event "Plane Strikes Building" shown
in FIG. 12, and is returned to the standard browser interface
displaying this Event. As in FIG. 5A, the right side of the
screen in FIG. 13 shows attributes and key relations for this
Event. In FIG. 13, these attributes and relations include:
The unique item ID no. (80119)
The date and time last modified
The last person who modified it (Ian Sturken)
The Event Sequence(s) this Event is a part of
The date and time the Event occurred
• shorter name for the event and X and Y coordinates for
display in the graphical Event Sequence Viewer
• confidence level regarding the event's occurrence (high)
The System(s) and Operator(s) involved in the Event
The Site where the Event occurred
The permissions for modifying and viewing this Event
FIG. 13 also shows other possible attributes, which were
not completed for this particular Event. Additionally, as in
FIG. 5A, the left side of the screen shows relations that have
been made between this Event and other items in the system.
Many more relations are possible, these are merely the ones
the investigator for this (fictitious) Event chose to create. In
FIG. 13, the Event "Plane Strikes Building":
is associated with an Incident Site (Charlie's Restaurant);
is followed an Event (Debris Shreds Starboard Control
Surfaces);
is included in an Event Sequence (Event Sequence Trial);
involved an Operator (Wendy Adams);
involved a System (NASA Airplane 134);
is preceded two other Events (Building Collapse and Data
Collection Ceased); and
was produced by the Plane Crash Investigation
The standard browser interface shown in FIG. 13 accepts
entry of a variety of commands, which are standard to most
items in the system:
creation of a New Item
initiating a Search
returning to the Home item
Go To a previously viewed item
Logout from the system
Help
Viewing the event Sequence graphical display (this is
unique to elements of an Event Sequence)
Edit the Links to create new relations or delete existing
relations
Modify the Event (name, attributes, and/or key relations)
change the Permissions on the event
Delete the Event
Duplicate the Event
Put the event In A Folder
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or by clicking on any otherblue underlined hyperlink, go to
the standard browser view of that item (e.g. Plane Crash,
Building Collapse, Ian Sturken)
FIG. 14 is a flow chart illustrating a method for investigat-
5 ing a target event, such as an event associated with a mishap,
by comparing relevant parameter values for each of one or
more similar situations in which the target event did not occur
with corresponding parameter values for the target event. In
step 501, the system receives a first sequence of values
Lo vI(kl), numbered k1=1, ... , K, of K parameters associated
with a mishap. In step 503, the system receives a second
sequence of values v2(k2), numbered k2=1, ... , K, corre-
sponding to the first sequence of parameter values and asso-
ciated at least one non-target event. In step 505, the system
15 compares each parameter value vl (kl=k) for the target event
with a corresponding parameter value, v2(k2=k) for the at
least one non-target event, and to determine a subset S' of
indices k' (1 <k'<K) for which parameter differences satisfy a
difference criterion, such as
20	 1v1(ki=)0-v2(k2=)0I'Erhr(k^,	 (1)
where E,,,(k') is a selected threshold difference value that may
depend upon the index V. In step 507, the system identifies at
least one index k' in the subset S' for which the parameter
25 value vl (kl=k') contributed to occurrence of the target event.
In operation, where two or more spaced apart users simul-
taneously utilize the system 11, each user has a separate
network browser interface 17 that makes use of the ontology
13, the semantic network 15 and the rule-based inference
30 engine 19 shown in FIG. 1. A selected screen, such as that
shown in any of FIG. 5A-5C, 11, 12 or 13, can be simulta-
neously displayed at one, two or more network browser inter-
faces, for viewing by the users. Where a first user adds, deletes
or changes ("modifies") a screen, for example, to add a new
35 attribute and to establish one or more links between the new
attribute and selected attributes that are already in place, all
screens that are affected by this activity are optionally "fro-
zen" for a selected time-out interval, having a selected tem-
poral length of between 15 and 180 sec, while the modifica-
40 tion is set up for implementation. The proposed modification
is, or is not, implemented by the system, depending upon a
consensus reached by the users. Where first and second users
propose modifications at approximately the same time, well
known conflict protocols can be used to resolve this. Two
45 spaced apart users of the system 11 may be any distance apart
(e.g., between 1 meter and 10' meters (M=1-7) and will
communicate by wired or wireless telephonic means, by
e-mail, by television means or by any other suitable audibly
and/or visually perceptible communication means.
50 Optionally, each modification in a document is tracked and
the date, time, identity of the user-modifier and/or specific
modifications) are determined and archived. This provides
an "audit trail" and a chronology for any document that is part
of, or contributes to, the investigation report.
55
What is claimed is:
1. A system for analyzing a mishap that has occurred, the
system comprising:
a reconfigurable ontology associated with a selected mis-
60 hap, including a list of at least first and second ontology
classes related to the selected mishap, at least one defi-
nition or property for each of the at least two ontology
classes, a value range associated with each of the at least
two ontology classes, and at least one relationship or link
65 between the at least two ontology classes, wherein at
least one of the at least first and second ontology classes
includes information on at least one of the following: a
US 7,590,606 B1
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collection of one or more persons assembled to investi-
gate the mishap; a project with which the mishap is
associated; a process or procedure associated with the
mishap; at least one person involved in or responsible
one or more events leading directly to the mishap; at
least one location or site associated with the mishap; a
characterization of the mishap; a record associated with
the mishap; a document associated with the mishap;
physical evidence associated with the mishap; a value of
a parameter that is part of a description associated with
the mishap; a characterization or classification of a sub-
system associated with the mishap; an interview of at
least one person associated with the mishap; a descrip-
tion of at least one operation associated with the mishap;
at least one inspection associated with the mishap; at
least one design record of at least one component asso-
ciated with the mishap; an analysis of at least one aspect
of the mishap; and at least one result of an investigation
of the mishap;
a semantic network that receives, indexes, stores and inte-
grates, for retrieval, the at least two ontology classes, the
definition and the value ranges of the at least two ontol-
ogy classes and the at least one link between the at least
two ontology classes;
a network browser interface, having a display screen, that
implements a procedure for retrieving and viewing each
of the at least two ontology classes in the semantic
network, wherein the browser interface (i) displays at
least one screen having at least a first group and a second
group of possible conclusions concerning a contributing
factor to the mishap, where no possible conclusion in the
first group also belongs to the second group and (ii)
displays at least one conclusion in the first group or in the
second group that is characterized as at least one of the
following: not a credible conclusion; an unlikely con-
clusion; a credible conclusion; conclusion needs analy-
sis; conclusion needs supporting data; conclusion pro-
posed to be closed; and an un-reviewed conclusion; and
a rule-based inference engine, including a collection of at
least two rules, associated with one or more of the at least
two ontology classes and applied to support the at least
one conclusion displayed in the browser interface.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein said browser interface
displays at least one screen having a first screen portion that
displays at least one parameter associated with said first
ontology class and having a second, simultaneously viewable
screen portion that displays at least one additional ontology
class that is related or linked to said first ontology class
displayed in the first screen portion.
3. The system of claim 1, wherein a link is provided
between said at least one conclusion concerning said mishap
and at least one item of evidence that supports said at least one
conclusion.
4. The system of claim 1, wherein a link is provided
between said at least one conclusion concerning said mishap
and at least one item of evidence that refutes said at least one
conclusion.
5. The system of claim 1, wherein said browser interface
displays at least one screen having at least one statement of a
condition, displayed in a first format, and at least one state-
ment of an event, displayed in a second format that is distin-
guishable from the first format, where the at least one condi-
tion statement is visually connected to the at least one event
statement and at least one final event statement is directly or
indirectly visually connected to all condition statements and
to all event statements other than a final event statement.
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6. The system of claim 1, wherein said browser interface
displays at least one screen having at least one view sequence,
drawn from a list of view sequences including "included in,"
"supports," "refutes," "refuted by," "supported by," "date of
5 sequence," "short name description of sequence," "start time
of sequence," "end time of sequence," "description of
sequence," "confidence level," "involved system," "associ-
ated site," "involved operator," "investigation," "x position
for sequence," "y position for sequence," "notes," "write per-
io mission," and "read permission."
7. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on said
collection of persons assembled to investigate said mishap
includes information on at least one of the following: at least
one meeting agenda for said collection of persons; at least one
15 receipt or generation of request for information associated
with said mishap; background on at least one of said collec-
tion of persons; at least one investigation procedure imple-
mented by said collection of persons; and at least one inves-
tigation report associated with said mishap.
20 8. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on said
project associated with said mishap includes information on
at least one of the following: at least one project control; at
least one project plan; at least one project procedure; at least
one project review; at least one project mission; at least one
25 mission description; at least one mission timeline; and at least
one mission requirement.
9. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on said
process associated with said mishap includes information on
at least one of the following: a description of said process; at
so least one process control implemented for saidprocess; and at
least one operating procedure for said process.
10. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on
said at least one person involved in or responsible for said
35 mishap includes information on at least one of the following:
background on said at least one person; at least one work
group or work unit to which said at least one person belongs;
said at least one person's normal work responsibilities; iden-
tification of at least one investigator of said mishap; and a
40 statement of at least one task for the at least one investigator
of said mishap.
11. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on
said location associated with said mishap includes informa-
tion on at least one of the following: at least one recommen-
45 dation for said at least one location or site associatedwith said
mishap, as a result of said investigation; location of at least
one evidence processing site associatedwith said mishap; and
location of at least one record impound site associated with
said mishap.
50 12. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on
said characterization of said mishap event includes informa-
tion on at least one of the following: type of said mishap;
immediate consequences of said mishap; indirect conse-
quences of said mishap; speculative factors that may have
55 contributed to said mishap; confirmed factors that appear to
have contributed to said mishap; recommended changes in at
least one procedure to avoid or reduce a likelihood of another
occurrence of said mishap; and recommended changes in at
least one equipment item or component to avoid or reduce the
60 likelihood of another occurrence of said mishap.
13. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on
said records associated with said mishap includes informa-
tion on at least one of the following: at least one relevant
written or published or visually perceptible document asso-
65 ciated with said mishap; location of at least one written or
published document relevant to said mishap; at least one
visually perceptible record relevant to said mishap; at least
US 7,590,606 B1
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one audibly perceptible record relevant to said mishap; and at
least one anomaly in at least one of said records relevant to
said mishap.
14. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on
documents associated with said mishap includes information
on at least one of the following: at least one relevant agree-
ment respecting a project associatedwith said mishap; at least
one analysis report record; at least one incident report record;
at least one personnel performance record for at least one
person associated with the project; at least one training record
for at least one person associated with the project; at least one
control procedure for at least one person associated with the
project; at least one record of adherence to the at least one
control procedure for at least one person associated with the
project; and at least one project review document for the
project.
15. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on
said sub-system of said mishap includes information on at
least one of the following: at least one design for a project
associated with said mishap; at least one design record for the
project; at least one analysis of at least one design for the
project; at least one preceding record of a preceding mishap;
at least one risk assessment for the project; at least one test
and verification record for the project; and at least one inte-
gration record for the project.
16. The system of claim 1, wherein said information on
analysis of said mishap includes information on at least one of
the following: at least one result from application of fault tree
analysis to a project associated with said mishap; at least one
result from application of MORT analysis to the project; at
least one result from application of event sequence analysis to
the project; at least one result from application of comparison
of at least one parameter for the project and for a similar
project in which a mishap did not occur.
17. The system of claim 1, wherein said semantic network
comprises a link adjustment mechanism for performing at
least one of the following operations: creation of a link
between said at least two ontology classes, deletion of a link
between said at least first and second ontology classes, and
addition of an ontology class and creation of at least one link
between the added class and at least one of said at least first
and second ontology classes.
18. The system of claim 1, wherein:
said semantic network provides said at least first and sec-
ond ontology classes, said definition and said value
range of said at least first and second ontology classes
and said at least one link between said at least first and
second ontology classes for each of at least first and
second users that are spaced apart by a distance in a
range of between 1 meter and 20,000 km; and
for each of said indices k' in said subset S', where F k,{u} is a
monotonically increasing function of its argument u.
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the first and second users are provided with first and second
network browser interfaces, respectively, with each net-
work browser interface providing a procedure for
retrieving and viewing each of said at least first and
s second ontology classes in said semantic network, and
each of the first and second users has access to said
rule-based inference engine.
19. The system of claim 1, wherein at least one of said
ontology, said semantic network, said network browser inter-
io face and said inference engine facilitates recording, for
retrieval, of at least one of (i) at least one modification is made
in at least one document associated with said mishap, (ii) a
date and time at which the at least one modification is made
and (iii) an identity of a user who makes the at least one
15 modification.
20. A system for analyzing a mishap event that has
occurred, the system comprising a computer that is pro-
grammed:
to receive a first sequence of values vl(kl), numbered
20	 k1=1, ... , K, of K parameters associated with a mishap
event;
to receive a second sequence of values v2(k2), numbered
k2=1, ... , K, corresponding to the first sequence of
parameter values and associated at least one non-mishap
25	 event;
to compare each parameter value vl (kl=k) for the mishap
event with a corresponding parameter value, v2(k2=k)
for the at least one non-mishap event, and to determine
and to display on a screen a subset S' of indices k'
30	 (l ­ k'-:^K) for which parameter differences satisfy a
difference criterion
Ivl (ki=)0-v2(k2=)0I'Erhjk^,
where E,,,(k') is a selected threshold difference value that
35	 may depend upon the index k; and
to identify at least one index value, k'=k", in the subset S'
for which the parameter value vl (klk") contributed to
occurrence of the mishap event, and to display a char-
acterization of the parameter with the index value k'=k".
40	 21. The system of claim 20, wherein said system identifies
said at least one index k' in said subset S' for which said
parameter value vl(kl=k') contributed to occurrence of said
mishap event by comparing a value of each of a sequence of
functions
45	
F,{ I vl (k1=)0-v2(k2=)0 I }
